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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.
KENNETH RAY UNDERWOOD,

:
Appellate Court No. 20070216-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a finding of guilt of Burglary, a second degree
felony in violation of §76-6-202, and for Theft, a second degree felony in
violation of §76-6-404. The Defendant was found guilty at a bench trial on
September 27, 2005. He was sentenced November 3, 2005, to an indeterminate
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years on the burglary
charge and an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than
fifteen years on theft charge, to be served concurrently, by the Honorable
Parley R. Baldwin of the Second District Court of Weber County. This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(e).

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
WAS THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO CONFRONT WITNESSES VIOLATED AND WAS
IMPROPER EVIDENCE ADMITTED WHEN HEARSAY
EVIDENCE
WAS
ADMITTED
INTO
EVIDENCE
THROUGH SEVERAL WITNESSES?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Our standard of review on the admissibility of
hearsay evidence is complex, since the determination of admissibility 'often
contains a number of rulings, each of which may require a different standard of
review.'" State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 10, 122 P.3d 639 (quoting Norman
H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate Review, 12 Utah Bar J. 8, 38 (1999)).
Legal questions regarding admissibility are reviewed for correctness, and
questions of fact are reviewed for clear error. See id. And, "[f]inally, we review
the district court's ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion." Id.
{State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517 If 10, 153 P.3d 830)
POINTII
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OR
AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S
CASE FOR THE REASONS THAT THERE WAS
INSUFFICENT
EVIDENCE
TO
SUPPORT
A
CONVICTION?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This Court should use a question of law

standard of review. "We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we
conclude as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant
conviction."

State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

Furthermore, this Court should review the evidence "in a light most favorable
to the jury verdict," State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), and
reverse the Defendant's conviction only if "the evidence is so inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime." Smith, 927 P.2d at
651 (citations and quotations omitted). Since Defendant didn't move for a
directed verdict, it should be reviewed under a plain error standard of review.
"[T]o establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from
an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the
following: (i) an error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant..." State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
POINT III
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE
3

1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY THE TRIAL COURT'S EARLY
DENIAL OF OBJECTIONS, WHICH TRAINED THE
DEFENDANT NOT TO OBJECT, AND BY HIS FAILURE
TO MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter
of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two-part test, which
was adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine
whether counsel was ineffective. The Court held that;
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Id at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
POINT IV
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO
EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY REGARDING THE COINS
OBTAINED FROM ATTORNEY CRAMER'S OFFICER
WHERE THE STATE FAILED TO PROPERLY
ESTABLISH A PROPER CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF
EVIDENCE?

4

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Preservation of the issue: The Defendant

properly preserved this issue by making several objections to the introduction
of evidence of the coins.

Standard of review; A trial court's determination

that there was a proper foundation for the admission of evidence "will not be
overturned unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion." State v.
Madsen, 498 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1972)
POINT V

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO
EVIDENCE SEVERAL EXHIBITS OVER THE
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION AND AFTER THE
PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENDANT HAD BOTH
RESTED THEIR CASE?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Preservation of the issue: The Defendanl

properly preserved this issue by objection to the introduction of the exhibits
after the State and defense had both rested.

Standard of review:

The

interpretation of case law presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness
State v. Rogers, 2006 UT 85, \ 7, 151 P.3d 171,
POINT VI
WAS THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO A FAIR TRIAL VIOLATED BECAUSE OF THE
NUMEROUS ERRORS THAT OCCURRED DURING HIS
TRIAL?

5

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine whether the
cumulative effect of the errors during the trial deprived the Defendant a fair
trial. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse only if 4the
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a
fair trial was had.'5' State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000)(quoting State
v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 277 (Utah 1998)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Fifth Amendment
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsoiy process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
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Fourteenth Amendment
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and
bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any
debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
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Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination,
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution
shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
8

(b)theft;
(c) an assault on any person;
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1);
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3);
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5).
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses
listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the
actor while he is in the building.
§76-6-404. Theft - Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 17. The trial.
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court,
for good cause, otherwise permits;

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 504

See attached Addendum B.
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Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable.
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes
situations in which the declarant:
(a)(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(a)(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(a)(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's
statement; or
(a)(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(a)(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement
has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other
reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim of
lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing
of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the
witness from attending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if
the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(b)(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor
in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination.
(b)(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the
declarant's death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith.
(b)(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so
far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the
10

declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to
be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
(b)(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by
blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or
family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal
knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the
other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the
matter declared.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by Information with Burglary, a second
degree felony, and Theft, a second degree felony. (R. 001-2). A bench trial
was held on September 26 and 27, 2005, wherein the Defendant was found
guilty on both counts.

Defendant was sentenced on November 3, 2005 (R.

139-140) to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than
fifteen years on the second degree felony Burglary, and an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years on the second degree
felony Theft at the Utah State Prison to be concurrent. Defendant filed a
Notice of Appeal on October 11, 2006, (R. 181-182) and counsel filed a Notice
of Appeal on November 30, 2006 (R. 212-213). A Motion to Reinstate a
Denied Right to Appeal was filed February 7, 2007 (R. 237-240) and the Order
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Reinstating a Denied Right to Appeal was entered on February 27, 2007 (R.
255-258). A Notice of Appeal was again filed with the Court on March 2,
2007 (R. 259-260).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant was charged with a second-degree felony car theft and a
second-degree felony house burglary. The Defendant waived his right to jury,
and the matter was tried before the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin on September
26 and 27, 2005. Prior to the trial commencing the court again asked the
Defendant if he wanted to proceed in a pro se capacity. The Defendant agreed
to do so, and the court appointed a public defender to sit through the trial as
standby counsel for Mr. Underwood in the proceedings. The attorney
specifically stated that he was not there to make objections during the course of
the trial.
The State's first witness was the Defendant's wife, Susan Weight, who
admitted that she had been previously convicted of two felony forgery charges
and a theft by deception felony.
She testified that at the time of the alleged offense the Defendant and she
had been separated for several months (R.308/21) On August 15, 2004, Ms.
Weight returned from going to church and noticed that her sister's car was
gone. (R.308/26) She and her family immediately went into the home; and she
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discovered that her purse, which contained her wallet, cell phone, and a True
Value pocket knife, was also missing. Several months later, in December 2004
after the parties were divorced, the Defendant then contacted the witness and
allowed her to pick up certain items of property from his property being held at
the Weber County jail. As she was going through those items she found the
pocket knife, a picture that had been cut from her driver's license, a picture of
their son Wyatt, and some postage stamps, together with a listing of cell phone
numbers. (R.308/35)
Ms. Weight testified that in the first part of December 2004 the
Defendant called her and informed her that his attorney had possession of some
medallions that had been allegedly taken from the premises.

(R.308/41)

During cross examination she admitted that she had no evidence that the
Defendant had entered the house on August 15 nor had she ever seen the
Defendant drive her sister's vehicle. (R.308/82)
During the course of the investigation information was obtained
regarding the use of an IP address from a stolen laptop computer. Ms. Weight
testified that the IP address was used from the stolen laptop on September 19,
2004, and September 21, 2004, during a time that the Defendant was locked up
in the St. George County jail. (R.308/87)
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The State called Stephanie Miya to the stand to testify. Ms. Miya had
previously been the Defendant's attorney and was being called to testify
regarding certain items of property that she picked up at the Defendant's
request. The Defendant objected to her testimony as a violation of Rule 504
the Utah Rules of Evidence. The court overruled that objection and ordered
that she testify. (R.308/56-64) Ms. Miya testified she had received and taken
two documents from the Defendant and presented one (plaintiffs exhibit
number four) to a pawn shop in Mesquite and picked up a box that contained a
number of unknown items. (R.308 /65-66) She then took the other document
(plaintiffs exhibit number six) to a pawn shop in Salt Lake City and picked up
a box containing unknown items at that pawn shop. She stated that she never
opened the boxes and therefore never knew of the contents. She testified that
these boxes were then delivered to Attorney Aric Cramer's office. Attorney
Cramer never testified; but the victim, Mr. Sheryl Weight, testified that he
observed loose coins on a table at Mr. Cramer's office and identified those
coins as being similar to the coins taken from the home of the victim.
During the course of the trial the prosecution asked numerous leading
questions. The Defendant, acting in a pro se capacity, finally objected to the
leading questions, which objection was overruled. (R.308 /104) Immediately
after the objection, the prosecution went through the following set of questions:
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Q. Did you tell [detective Quinney] that certain coins would not
be there?
A. Yes.
Q. And would those have been the ones that were in your
cabinet?
A. They were the ones left in the cabinet. (R.308 /104)
Later in the trial the Defendant again objected to the prosecution's
leading statements. This objection came immediately after the prosecutor asked
a witness concerning a specific date to which he answered he did not
remember. The prosecutor then posed a question as follows:
Q. Now, calling your attention back to that period of time soon
after - or in the 20's, say in August of 2003. You've indicated
that you were at the tattoo parlor or the tattoo shop. Did you see-?
The Defendant lodged his objection however the court ruled that the
question was not objectionable and could be answered. (R.308/147, 148) The
prosecution again followed with another leading question:
Q. Were you, on the date that the Defendant came into your store,
acquainted with the fact that your brother-in-law's home at 481
East 2850 North in North Ogden had been burglarized, and
Serena, your sister inlaw's car stolen? (R.308/148)
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The prosecution continued to ask leading questions throughout the trial.
Attached as Addendum C is a list of the leading questions asked throughout the
trial as well as the hearsay evidence introduced at trial. The citations are so
numerous that they have simply been referred to by the page and line number,
rather than including the context of each statement.
A St. George pawn shop owner, Jason Ray, testified that on August 18,
2004, Defendant came into the store and told him that his car had broken down
on the freeway or interstate. (R.309/190) The Defendant then sold Mr. Ray a
1898 $10 gold piece for $200.

(R.309/191) Mr. Ray did not recall a

description of the coin other than it was a $10 gold piece and testified that there
was no chain or anything attached to the gold piece. (R.309 /195) That coin
was never recovered.
Detective Quinney then gave a string of hearsay testimony in which he
talked about two other officers who informed him they had picked up a 2002
Salt Lake Olympic coin at a pawn shop in St. George. (R.309/203) He then
testified that he talked to individuals or examined records that indicated that the
Defendant had pawned some items in Mesquite, Nevada, or St. George, Utah.
(R.308/208)
Detective Quinney also testified that he had gone to a pawn shop in Salt
Lake City and discovered that a group of coins had been pawned by someone
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and later retrieved by Stephanie Miya.

(R. 309/211) Detective Quinney

testified that a Deputy Cardinal told him that the victim's vehicle had been
located in Scenic, Arizona. (R.309/214) Mr. Underwood objected to this
testimony and to the receiving of photographs of the location where the car was
supposedly found; however, the court again overruled those objections. (R.309
/217)
Detective Quinney testified, again in a hearsay manner, that he had been
told by someone at Tri-State Towing that they had picked up the automobile in
question in Nevada and moved it to their lot in Ogden. Detective Quinney
testified that he examined the vehicle and saw that it had been hotwired.
(R.309/220)
Upon cross examination, Detective Quinney acknowledged that they did
not find any fingerprints of the Defendant at the home that had been
burglarized, nor on the vehicle that had been stolen. (R.309/235, 243)
Detective Quinney further acknowledged that the vehicle in question was
located on September 26, 2004, and that the Defendant had been incarcerated
from September 9, 2004, until after September 26. (R.309/237) Detective
Quinney further testified that the individual that had found the car stated that
the car had not been there on September 25, 2004. (R.309/241)
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During the trial it became apparent that there were significant
discrepancies between the letter from the Defendant authorizing his attorney to
pick up 40 proof sets of coins from the pawn shop, the pawn shop slip which
stated that there were eight proof sets, and the number of proof sets entered
into evidence which was seven.

(R.309/257-259)

Detective Quinney

acknowledged that he could not say that the proof sets picked up at Attorney
Cramer's office were the same ones that came from Crown Jewel and Pawn
(R.309/267). Detective Quinney further acknowledged that he had not seen a
$10goldpiece. (R.309/271)
Detective Quinney further testified, "a description of the things that were
pawned on these pawn slips are not detailed enough to match them up" to those
items viewed at Attorney Cramer's office.

(R.309/312)

He further

acknowledged that the 88 coins picked up at the Virgin Valley Pawn shop were
simply 88 coins with no reference to LDS Temple Coins. (R.309/315)
The manager of Crown Jewel and Pawn testified that he could not
identify the Defendant as the individual that had pawned some items in the
store. (R.309/280) He testified that an individual named Kenneth Underwood
pawned a number of coins and that he later released those to Attorney Miya,
pursuant to a letter signed by Underwood allowing their release. (R.309/289)
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The State rested its case and immediately thereafter the Defendant
rested. After both sides had rested, the prosecution then made motions to enter
a number of exhibits into evidence. These exhibits included numbers 28, 16,
10, 11, 12, and 13. These exhibits were entered into evidence over the
Defendant's objection, although the Defendant did not articulate the objection
properly. (R.309/332, 333)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant raises six points on appeal. First, that the Defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses were violated through numerous
instances of hearsay testimony.

It is undisputed that the Defendant was

representing himself in a pro se capacity. During the course of the trial the
State code on evidence shows that was clearly hearsay, and violated the
Defendants constitutional right to confront his accusers. Despite the fact that
the Defendant lacked legal training, he objected to the hearsay testimony
(albeit not raising the constitutional implications), which objection was
overruled by the trial court. Those items of hearsay included evidence as to the
location and condition of the automobile that had been stolen from the victims,
and implied possession of a number of items of evidence seized from attorney
Cramer's office.
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Second, the trial court failed to dismiss the case for lack of evidence
after both the State and Defendant had rested. The Defendant believes that had
the trial court made proper rulings on objections, thereby excluding evidence of
the coins, evidence of the automobile, and other objections, there would have
been insufficient evidence to sustain a verdict.
Third, the trial court, through various incorrect rulings on significant
issues raised by objections by the pro se Defendant, in essence trained the
Defendant incorrectly that these objections had no merit. Once the Defendant
had been overruled on this objection, he failed to make any further objections
on those particular grounds, thereby allowing into evidence numerous hearsay
statements and numerous statements obtained via leading questions. Without
these original errors by trial court, the Defendant would have continued
objecting thereby excluding from trial sufficient evidence to sustain a motion
for a directed verdict. In essence, the Defendant, by virtue of the early incorrect
rulings of the trial court, was thereafter rendered ineffective, violating his Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel.
Fourth, the trial court allowed into evidence testimony regarding a
number of coins that were recovered from Attorney Cramer's office.

The

State, for no apparent reason, failed to call a crucial witness in the chain of
custody thereby calling into question the Defendant's connection to that
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evidence. His trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to move the trial
court for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the State's case.
Fifth, the trial court, over the objection of the pro se Defendant, entered
into evidence six plaintiff exhibits after both the prosecution and the defense
had rested.
Finally, the five preceding points constitute cumulative error, which in
essence would establish that the accumulation of these errors called into
question the verdict in the case.
ARGUMENT
POINTI
THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
CONFRONT WITNESSES WAS VIOLATED AND
IMPROPER EVIDENCE WAS ADMITTED WHEN
HEARSAY
EVIDENCE WAS ADMITTED
INTO
EVIDENCE THROUGH SEVERAL WITNESSES.
During the course of the trial, the prosecution utilized numerous hearsay
statements. Although the Defendant had standby counsel, he was operating in
the capacity of a pro se defendant throughout the trial. During the trial the
prosecution attempted to introduce evidence which was clearly hearsay.
Detective Quinney testified that a Deputy Cardinal told him that the victim's
vehicle had been located in Scenic, Arizona. (R.309/214) Mr. Underwood
objected to this testimony and to the receiving of photographs of the location
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where the car was supposedly found; however, the court overruled those
objections. (R.309/217)
Numerous other items of hearsay testimony were ultimately entered into
evidence. Shortly after the above-described exchange, the officer again
testified to conversation he had had with another individual at Tri-State Auto
regarding the location of the vehicle. Later in the trial, the prosecution put on
evidence regarding a table full of coins, viewed by Mr. Weight at Attorney
Cramer's office. Attorney Miya was not present at Attorney Cramer's office
during any of these transactions.
Although he would have been available, Attorney Cramer was never
called to testify regarding the origin and chain of custody of the coins. While
Attorney Miya testified that she had given Mr. Cramer a box of coins, it was
left to the assumption of the judge that these were the same coins received by
Attorney Miya. Unfortunately, these latter instances of hearsay, and implied
hearsay, were not objected to by the Defendant. This is unfortunate, because
the judge had overruled a previous hearsay objection which was legitimate,
thereby creating in the Defendant an incorrect definition as to what constituted
hearsay.
The hearsay that was admitted into evidence was extremely prejudicial
to the Defendant. By allowing the hearsay into evidence the Defendant was
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denied his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. Therefore,
the judge was left with the statements from three different witnesses who did
not testify that the vehicle had been abandoned in southern Utah or Nevada,
and that the vehicle in question had been hot wired. Furthermore the failure of
the prosecution to call Attorney Cramer to establish the proper chain of custody
resulted in additional implied hearsay testimony that the coins in question were
the same coins delivered by Attorney Miya to Cramer. It was only through
these various hearsay violations that the Defendant was tied to virtually all of
the relevant evidence connecting him to the crime.
In State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court
stated that "if the declarant is not present, the core values of the confrontation
right are implicated because the essence of the confrontation right is the
opportunity to have the accusing witness in court and subject to crossexamination, so that bias and credibility can be evaluated by the finder of fact."
M a t 1112.
The Defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine these
important witnesses against him. The judge heard their statements during the
State's opening statement and again through Detective Quinney, but he did not
get the opportunity to evaluate the witnesses' bias or credibility.
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In State v. Moosman, 19A P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme
Court held that "[i]f the evidence violates a defendant's right to confront
witnesses, it should not be admitted." Id. at 480. The Court then adopted a
two-part test to evaluate the extent of a violation of the right to confrontation.
Id. "First, we look at whether the State's presentation of hearsay testimony of
extrajudicial statements or occurrences is 'crucial to the state's case or
'devastating' to the defendant." Id.
In the case at bar, the hearsay testimony was clearly devastating to the
Defendant.

Without the hearsay testimony of Detective Quinney, the

Defendant could not have been tied to the stolen vehicle. Without the implied
hearsay from Mr. Weight, Attorney Miya, and Detective Quinney, the
Defendant could not have been tied to the coins. Without these two crucial
pieces of evidence, the state had little evidence on which to proceed.
Since the hearsay testimony was devastating to the Defendant, the first
part of the hearsay test is met. The second part of the test is "[s]econd, we look
at the availability of the declarant and whether the presence of the declarant
will add any probative value to the evidence by allowing the trier of fact to
observe the demeanor of the witness." Id.
In the present case, the State offered no explanation as to why these
individuals were not called to testify. Although the State called Attorney Miya
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to testify, they inexplicitly decided not to call Attorney Cramer. Furthermore,
although the State called Detective Quinney, they did not call either the
Nevada trooper or the owner of Tri-State Towing. There was no explanation
given why these individuals were not called as witnesses. In Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 1000, S.Ct. 2531 (1980), the Supreme Court articulated a two part
test for determining the admissibility of hearsay when a hearsay declarant is
not present for cross-examination at trial. First, there must be a showing of
'unavailability.' Second, if the declarant is unavailable, the statement at issue
is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Id. At 66, 1000
S.Ct. at 2539 (1980).
The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah
1994), "that constitutional unavailability is found only when it is 'practically
impossible to produce the witness in court.'" Id. At 402 (quoting, State v.
Webb, 779P.2datlll3).
The Utah Supreme Court also stated in Menzies, that "unavailability will
not be found merely because the witness would be uncomfortable on the stand
or . . . testifying would be stressful. In short, every reasonable effort must be
made to produce the witness." Id. (citations and quotations omitted). In the
present case, there is simply no evidence that the State made any effort to
procure these necessary witnesses. In a situation where both the prosecution
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and the trial court understand that a defendant is operating in a pro se capacity,
extra effort should be made to ensure a defendant's constitutional rights are not
violated.

Likewise, the extraordinary effort should be made by both the

prosecutor and the trial court to ensure that long-standing rules of evidence are
complied with during the prosecution's case in chief. These efforts simply
were not made, and a quantum of hearsay evidence was improperly admitted
into evidence which prejudiced the Defendant.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF
AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S
CASE FOR REASONS THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION.
In State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000), the Utah Supreme
Court held, "as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be
raised on appeal." However, this general rule is tempered when trial counsel's
performance falls below a reasonable standard. This is particularly true in a
situation where a defendant is proceeding on a pro se basis. This Court further
stated, "[i]t necessarily follows that the trial court plainly errs if it submits the
case to the jury and thus fails to discharge a defendant when the insufficiency of
the evidence is apparent to the court." Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
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The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome in
challenging a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. The Court's
power "to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence
is limited." State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155, % 22 3 P.3d 192. The Utah
Supreme Court has said,

"[s]o long as there is some evidence, including

reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the
crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. Mead 2001 UT 58,
^65, 27 P.3d 1115, (citations omitted). Additionally, in State v. Workman, 852
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993), the Court stated, "[ojrdinarily, a reviewing court
may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts
in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict."
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court
may overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's arrest of judgment from a conviction
of sexual exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid
if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative
possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence,
expert or otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for
purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the
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defendant's guilty verdict. Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d
443 (Utah 1983) the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second
degree murder case where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case
there was undisputed evidence that the victim had been murdered. The sole
evidence against the defendant consisted of the fact that the defendant was the
last person seen with the victim, and the fact that he had related a dream to
three individuals in which he recalled slapping the girl and that he "thought he
hurt her. He thought he might have killed her." Id. at 446. In that case, the
Court also stated:
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary
fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that the court can
take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a
verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be
sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt/<£ at 444-445.
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 63
P.3d 94, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conviction of
evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined
that a second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual.
No other evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was
found; but rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had
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the motive and opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that
conviction, the Court held:
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the
defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that
the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the
evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had
the opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if
indeed it ever existed. Id. at 100.
While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence
in support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an
extensive marshaling of evidence the verdict cannot be supported.
The problem with the State's case is that there are significant gaps in
testimony received at trial that tie the Defendant to the crimes charged. The
prosecution argued that the Defendant stole the vehicle in question on August
15; and to support that theory claimed that he was without an automobile on
that date. (Closing argument R.309/334) According to the State's theory the
Defendant drove the vehicle to St. George and on August 18 pawned some
items in St. George. At that time the vehicle is supposedly inoperable because
the Defendant arrived in the pawn shop sweating, carrying a heavy bag, and
stating that his car had broken down. However, by the 19th of August the
Defendant somehow arrived in Mesquite, Nevada; and further, the Defendant
somehow supposedly appeared in Salt Lake on August 23 to pawn additional
coins without the benefit of a vehicle that had broken down on August 18.
29

Under the State's theory, the vehicle was hot wired sometime shortly after
August 18.
The Defendant was then arrested in St. George on or about September 9
on unrelated charges; yet somehow the vehicle makes it down to Scenic,
Arizona, on September 26 where the vehicle is apparently located by the
police. The prosecution theorizes that the only method of transportation the
Defendant would have to get to St. George is the stolen vehicle, (R.309/334)
yet has no explanation as to how the Defendant traveled back to Salt Lake City
and then again to St. George to be arrested in the vehicle that had broken down
in St. George.
The significant gaps in testimony continue in the prosecution's attempt
to tie stolen coins to the Defendant. It is important to note that none of the
coins in question were unique. It is also important to observe that the victim's
list of stolen coins differs from the very cursory and inadequate list obtained
from the pawn shop owners and further differs from the list of coins seized
from Attorney Cramer's office. The prosecution further failed to put Attorney
Cramer on the stand to testify as to the origin of the coins he delivered to the
police. There is absolutely no evidence that those coins were the ones received
from Attorney Miya, other than inadmissible hearsay. Is important to recognize
that attorney Miya never testified that the items she received from the pawn
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shop were coins. In fact she testified that she never examined the contents of
the boxes she received from the pawn shops. Due to this significant and
critical gap in the chain of evidence, the judge would then be required to
speculate as to the origin of the coins obtained from Attorney Cramer. Since
Attorney Cramer did not testify, it is possible that he received the coins
presented to the police from a criminal client or other source rather than from
Attorney Miya.
The problem with the burglary case is again there are significant gaps in
evidence to attempt to tie the Defendant to the burglary. There is evidence that
nine days prior to the burglary the Defendant was served with papers in the
cemetery across the street from the home. There is evidence that the Defendant
was in St. George and pawned items similar to those stolen from the home.
That is the extent of the evidence for the burglary. There were no fingerprints
from the Defendant found at the scene. The vehicle stolen at the time was
found hot wired and abandon over a month later in Scenic, Arizona. It is
significant to note that the vehicle was known to have been driven two weeks
after the Defendant had been continuously incarcerated in jail.
Additionally, the evidence regarding the laptop computer calls the
validity of the verdict in question. The victim testified that utilizing computer
technologies she was able to establish that her computer IP address had been
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utilized on two dates the Defendant was incarcerated in the St. George jail.
While the evidence also indicated that the computer had been used shortly after
the burglary occurred and while the Defendant was out of jail, the fact that it
was thereafter used during periods of the Defendant's incarceration calls into
question the possession of the stolen item by the Defendant.
The final element is that the error was harmful.

Based on the

insufficiency of the evidence the Defendant should not have been convicted.
Therefore, he was prejudiced by the court's failure to dismiss the case, and his
convictions should be reversed.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY THE TRIAL COURT'S EARLY
DENIAL OF OBJECTIONS, WHICH TRAINED THE
DEFENDANT NOT TO OBJECT AND BY HIS FAILURE
TO MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland,
the Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's
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assistance was ineffective.

"First, the defendant must show that counsel's

performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at
687, 80L.Ed.2dat693.
While the defendant recognizes that he made an effectual waiver of
counsel and elected to proceed in a pro se capacity, his right to effective
assistance of counsel is nonetheless guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
Although there are numerous cases that say that once a defendant makes the
election proceeding in a pro se capacity, he thereafter cannot complain of
ineffective assistance. (State v. Houston, 2006 UT App 437, ^ 5, 147 P.3d 543)
That does not end the inquiry there.
In the recent case of Orem City v. Bovo, 2003 UT App 86, fl2, 76 P.3d
1170, this Court was presented with a case wherein the defendant validly
waived his right to counsel and elected to proceed in a pro se capacity.
Thereafter the court made some errors which affected the outcome of the trial
This Court, in reviewing those errors, stated:
Although a pro se defendant is required to adhere to procedural
rules and the law, leniency may be appropriate in limited
circumstances.
A pro se defendant's "lack of technical
knowledge of law and procedure...should be accorded every
consideration that may reasonably be indulged." In some
instances, lack of accurate advice by the trial court may be
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"fundamentally unfair" for pro se party.
emphasis added)

(Citations omitted,

The Court further stated that, "We therefore conclude defendant was misled by
the trial court and the city and consequently, defendant was unfairly deprived
of the jury trial." (Id. at f 13)
In the present case there were numerous errors committed by the trial
court that improperly implied to the Defendant that his valid objections were
invalid. On two occasions early in the trial the Defendant suggested to the court
that the state was leading its witnesses. After several leading questions, the
Defendant, acting in a pro se capacity, finally objected to the leading questions,
which objection was overruled. (R.308 /104) Immediately after the objection,
the prosecution went through the following set of questions:
Q. Did you tell [detective Quinney] that certain coins would not
be there?
A. Yes.
Q. And would those have been the ones that were in your cabinet?
A. They were the ones left in the cabinet. (R.308/104)
The Defendant again objected to the prosecution's leading statements.
This objection came immediately after the prosecutor asked a witness
concerning a specific date to which he answered he did not remember. The
prosecutor then posed a question as follows:
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Q. Now, calling your attention back to that period of time soon
after - or in the 20, say in August of 2003. You indicated that
you were at the tattoo parlor or the tattoo shop. Did you see-?
The defendant lodged his objection; however, the court ruled that the question
was not objectionable and could be answered.

(R.308/147, 148) The

prosecution again followed with another leading question:
Q. Were you, on the date that the defendant came into your store,
acquainted with the fact that your brother-in-law's home at 481
East 2850 North in North Ogden had been burglarized, and Serena,
your sister in law's car stolen? (R.308 A48)
The Defendant made no further objections to leading questions because
he had been trained by the trial court that these objections would not be
sustained.
The same thing occurred in regard to the introduction of improper
evidence, which constituted hearsay confrontation clause violations. As
I
discussed in Point I above, the trial court allowed into evidence information
which constituted hearsay, a violation of the Defendant's right to crossexamine witnesses, which was clearly objectionable. One such instance
occurred during the testimony of Detective Quinney who testified that Deputy
Cardinal told him that the victim's vehicle had been located in Scenic, Arizona.
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(R.308 111 A) Mr. Underwood objected to this testimony and to the receiving of
photographs of the location where the car was supposedly found; however, the
court overruled those objections. (R.308 /217)
Furthermore, the Defendant made objections regarding the introduction
into evidence of the coins question and his attorney's testimony regarding its
coins. (R.308 / 56-64)

Although the objections made by the Defendant

specifically revolved around his attorney client privilege, he certainly did not
believe that it was proper for the State to introduce evidence regarding the
coins allegedly obtained by his counsel and delivered to Attorney Cramer's
office. Although the Defendant did not properly articulate that objection, it
should have been obvious to the trial court that there was a chain of custody
issue regarding the coins. Based upon the Defendant's earlier objections, the
trial court should have excluded the evidence.
Perhaps the most telling effect of this in proper devised by the trial court
occurred at one point when the Defendant was asked by the court whether or
not he objected to the introduction of an exhibit and the following discussion
occurred.
THE COURT: ...Mr. Underwood, any objections to [Exhibit] 16?
MR. UNDERWOOD: Doesn't matter if I object or not.
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THE COURT: It clearly matters, Mr. Underwood. I'm just trying
to rule on the law as I have it. Do you have objections to
that?
MR. UNDERWOOD: Whatever (inaudible).
THE COURT: Thank you. It's received.
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 16 received)
( Trial transcript page 186 lines 2-8)
The right of an accused to confront witnesses against him is a
fundamental right guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. See,
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 479 (Utah 1990). The Defendant's
constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated when the trial court
allowed hearsay evidence on several important issues from numerous State's
witnesses.
The Defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine these
important witnesses against him.

The judge heard numerous hearsay

statements during the course of the trial as described above. All of these
statements were hearsay.
In State v. Moosman, 19A P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme
Court held that "[i]f the evidence violates a defendant's right to confront
witnesses, it should not be admitted." Id. at 480. The Court then adopted a
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two-part test to evaluate the extent of a violation of the right to confrontation.
Id. "First, we look at whether the State's presentation of hearsay testimony of
extrajudicial statements or occurrences is 'crucial to the state's case or
'devastating' to the defendant.'" Id.
In the case at bar, the hearsay testimony was clearly devastating to the
Defendant.

Virtually the entire substance of evidence produced at trial

regarding the coins and the stolen vehicle were hearsay. Although the original
testimony regarding the missing vehicle would not constitute hearsay, the
evidence as to where the vehicle was ultimately located, and numerous aspects
concerning the vehicle were all hearsay statements. Furthermore, virtually all
of the testimony regarding the finding of the coins that were adduced as
exhibits at trial, the chain of custody on the coins, as well as other aspects of
the coins constituted hearsay statements.
Since the hearsay testimony was devastating to the Defendant, the first
part of the hearsay test is met. The second part of the test is to "look at the
availability of the declarant and whether the presence of the declarant will add
any probative value to the evidence by allowing the trier of fact to observe the
demeanor of the witness." Id.
This part of the test is rather obvious. In this particular case there is
simply no reason that the prosecution did not call these witnesses to testify.
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There was no showing that they were unavailable, most were located within the
State of Utah or very close nearby, and in fact, other witnesses were called to
testify with no apparent difficulty. The fact that Defendant was unable to crossexamine and establish biases, inconsistencies, and possible ulterior motives
undermines the abilities of even an effective defense counsel.
In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 1000, S.Ct. 2531 (1980), the Supreme
Court articulated a two-part test for determining the admissibility of hearsay
when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial. First,
there must be a showing of 'unavailability.'

Second, if the declarant is

unavailable, the statement at issue is admissible only if it bears adequate
indicia of reliability. Id at 56, 1000 S.Ct. at 2539 (1980).
The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah
1994), "that constitutional unavailability is found only when it is 'practically
impossible to produce the witness in court.'" Id. at 402 (quoting, State v. Webb,
779P.2datlll3).
The Utah Supreme Court also stated in Menzies, that "unavailability will
not be found merely because the witness would be uncomfortable on the stand
or ... testifying would be stressful. In short, every reasonable effort must be
made to produce the witness." Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
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Pursuant to Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, none of the
declarants could be classified as an unavailable witness. Neither can any of the
hearsay statements fit under any of the general hearsay exceptions. None of
the statements would ban against pecuniary interest, none would be general
business records, or any of the other exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Even if the witnesses could be declared unavailable, that still violates the
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. The right of a defendant in
a criminal case to confront his accusers is paramount and supersedes any
limitation or exception through hearsay rules. The United States Supreme
Court has recently ruled on this issue in the case of Crawford vs. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 U.S. (2004). In that case, Justice Scalia, writing
for a unanimous Court, held that the use of an out-of-court statement by a wife
against her husband, when his claims of marital privilege precluded her in
court testimony, would not be allowed because where testimonial statements
are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional
demands is confrontation." Emphasis added.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO
EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY REGARDING THE COINS
OBTAINED FROM ATTORNEY CRAMER'S OFFICE
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WHERE THE STATE FAILED TO PROPERLY
ESTABLISH A PROPER CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF
EVIDENCE
During the course of the trial, the State introduced evidence regarding a
box of coins that were seized from the offices of Attorney Aric Cramer. Over
the objection of the Defendant, his previous counsel Attorney Miya testified
she had picked up two boxes, with unknown contents, from two separate
pawnshops. She testified that she had never looked into the boxes, did not
know their contents, and had simply kept the boxes in her office until she later
delivered those to new counsel Aric Cramer. Mr. Cramer was never called to
testify and therefore could not establish any evidence regarding these issues.
The State never made a showing that Mr. Cramer was unavailable to testify.
After that significant break in the chain of custody, the State put on
evidence through Mr. Weight that he went to the offices of Aric Cramer,
reviewed a number of coins which were sitting on his table, and determined
that they were similar to those coins which were taken from his home during
the burglary.
In State v. Eagle Book, Inc., 583 P.2d 73 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme
Court stated that "[t]he circumstances surrounding the preservation and
custody of the article and the likelihood of tampering are factors to be
considered in determining its admissibility." Id. at 74. In State v. Watson, 684
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P.2d 39 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court stated the chain of custody
doctrine "has its greatest force where the physical evidence in question is
fungible or subject to alteration. In those circumstances, the chain of custody
is required to show that there has been no tampering, alteration, or substitution
of the evidence." Id. at 40.
While the Defendant understands that deficiencies in the chain may go to
the weight, the State still needs to lay the appropriate foundation before the
evidence can be admitted into evidence. In United States v. Clonts, 966 F.2d
1366 (10th Cir. 1992), the Court stated that, "[t]he degree of proof needed to
establish an uninterrupted chain of custody depends upon the nature of the
evidence at issue. If the evidence is unique, readily identifiable and resistant to
change, the foundation for admission need only be testimony that the evidence
is what it purports to be." Id. at 1368. In the case at bar, an important part of
the evidence are the coins seized from Attorney Cramer's office. These are not
"readily identifiable", and in fact could not be positively identified by the
witnesses at trial. Although Mr. Weight claimed that the coins were similar, he
could not say that they were the same coins that were taken from his home nor
did the lists produced by the victim match the list of coins obtained at attorney
Cramer's office. Therefore, "the trial court requires a more elaborate chain of
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custody to establish that the evidence has not been tampered with or altered."
Id.
In United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528 (10th Cir. 1989), the Court
stated that the "condition precedent to the admission of real evidence is met by
providing the proper foundation." The Court also stated that if the evidence
was not readily identifiable, "the trial court requires a more stringent
foundation entailing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness
to render it improbable that the original item h^s either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with."

Id. at 1531 (emphasis in

original, quotations and citations omitted).
In the present case there is no explanation why the prosecution did not
call Mr. Cramer to testify. There was no showing of unavailability, they had
made arrangements previously to call Attorney Miya and did in fact call her to
testify; and had they called Mr. Cramer to testify, the Defendant would have
been able to exercise his constitutional right to confront his accusers. The
prosecution's failure to establish a critical link in the chain of custody should
be grounds for reversal.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO
EVIDENCE
SEVERAL
EXHIBITS
OVER
THE
DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTION
AND
AFTER
THE
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PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENDANT HAD BOTH
RESTED THEIR CASE.
Rule 17 (g)(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
after both the prosecution and the defense has rested its case, "thereafter, the
parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause,
otherwise permits" In State v. Gergorious, 16 P.2d 893,895 Utah (1932), the
State was permitted to reopen the case after the state had rested. However, in
the case at hand, the Defendant, pro se and following the State's lead, rested as
well. In these circumstances, not only did the Defendant rely on the State's
decision to rest in moving to rest himself, but when the Judge allowed the State
to go back and admit further exhibit items, the Defendant was not prepared and
could not (especially acting pro se) react quickly enough to counter effectively
after the Defendant thought the case was closed.
In the case of State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah, 1986), the Court
was presented with a case where at preliminary hearing the State failed to put
on sufficient evidence to support a bind over. Thereafter the State attempted to
refile the case and hold another preliminary hearing putting on the additional
evidence. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that due process concerns prohibited
a second preliminary hearing under the following due process considerations:
We find merit in the approach taken by the Oklahoma courts. In
Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla.Crim.App.1971), the
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Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that due process
considerations prohibit a prosecutor from refiling criminal
charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the
prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable
evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling.
While the Defendant recognizes that the current case does not involve the
refiling of the case after a failed preliminary hearing, the same concepts should
apply where the State has failed to put on sufficient evidence and the
Defendant has rested his case in reliance thereon. While the Defendant
recognizes that the case of State v. Rogers, 2006 UT 85, \ 12, 151 P.3d 171,
allowed the continuation of the preliminary hearing based upon a prosecutor's
motion, the Court continued to recognize the due process concerns involved in
such a continuance. In that case the Court stated, "Continuances present none
of the potentially abusive practices Brickey and its progeny sought to prevent.
A defendant's due process rights are rarely implicated when a continuance is
allowed."(Id. atf 12)
In a case cited by the Utah Supreme Court, State v. McClelland, 24
Wash. App. 689, 604 P.2d 969, 971 (1979) (quoted by the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 (Utah, 1983) at 146), when the proceeding
did not adjourn, and the defendants were still present, the trial court was said to
have had discretion to permit reopening the cas0.
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But the case at hand is here distinguished again because the State and
Defendant both rested in a bench trial, not a jury trial, and the defendant was
pro se, not with counsel. And thirdly, in the Dyer decision cited above, the
Utah court explained that although there was an adjournment in that case, it did
not signal the conclusion of the trial because the purpose of the adjournment
was clearly "to provide counsel adequate opportunity to prepare additional
arguments...and thus assist the court in reaching its ultimate and final
decision." State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 (Utah, 1983). In the case at hand the
resting of both parties signaled the conclusion of the trial, especially in the
eyes of the Defendant, who was not an attorney but a pro se lay person. When
the judge allowed exhibits in after the resting by the State, followed by the
Defendant, the purpose of the court's actions were not only confusing but
unfair to the Defendant who did not know how to react. Although the cases
cited above support a showing of no error by the judge, the case at hand is
distinguished due to the facts that this was a bench trial, the defendant was pro
se, and the State and Defendant both rested their cases. This resting by both
parties was surely reasonably read by Defendant to be an adjournment of the
case and confusing to the Defendant when suddenly more exhibits were
allowed to be presented by the state. These problems rise to the level of due
process violations.
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POINT VI
THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A
FAIR TRIAL WAS VIOLATED BECAUSE OF THE
NUMEROUS ERRORS THAT OCCURRED DURING HIS
TRIAL,
Even if all of the errors were individually harmless, they were
cumulatively harmful. Under the cumulative error doctrine this Court should
reverse the Defendant's conviction. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, we
will reverse only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our
confidence . . . that a fair trial was had." State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177, 186
(Utah2000).
The errors in the Defendant's trial were numerous. They started during
the State's opening statement and continued until the rebuttal portion of the
State's closing argument. They have been outlined and briefed above. The
result of these many errors was that the Defendant did not receive a fair trial
and was not afforded the due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. For
this reason, the conviction should be reversed and the Defendant should be
granted a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The State failed to prove all of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Based on the lack of evidence, reasonable minds should have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crimes he was convicted of.
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For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse his
convictions. In the alternative, the Defendant believes that his due process
rights were violated by the numerous cumulative errors of the trial court, and
therefore respectfully request this Court to reverse the conviction and remand
for a new trial.
DATED this ^ f d a y of April 2008.
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SECOND DISTPICT COURT
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vn
vs .

Case No: 041906660 FS

KENNETH RAY UNDERWOOD,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

vy

PARLEY R. BALDWIN
November 3, 2 0 05

PRESENT
Clerk:
debbieg
Prosecutor: WILLIAM DAINES
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): BERNIE ALLEN, PDA
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 31, 19 63
Video
Tape Number:
B1103 05
Tape Count: 10:27
CHARGES
1. BURGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/27/2005 Guilty
2. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/27/2005 Guilty
HEARING
This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in custody
and is represented by Bernie Allen, public defender. Court proceeds
with sentencing.

Page 1

Case No: 041906660
Date:
Nov 03, 2005
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The Court recommends a concurrent sentence.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court orders restitution in the amount of $17,147.44 on behalf
of State Farm Insurance and $825.00 on behalf of the Shirl Weight
to be collected by the Department of Corrections upon the
defendant's parole.

Dated this

g

day of

//hi/

,/^OS.
PARLEY R. BALDWIN
District Court Judge

Page 2 (last)
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Rule 504. Lawyer-client
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or corporation, association,
or other organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered
professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view
to obtaining professional legal services.
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to
be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation.
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the lawyer in a
rendition of professional legal services.
(4) A "representative of the client" is one having authority to obtain
professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on
behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with the
lawyer concerning a legal matter.
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the lawyer in the course of
representing the client and includes disclosures of the client and the client's
representatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's representative incidental to the
professional relationship.
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition
of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for
the transmission of the communication.
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services
to the client between the client and the client's representatives, lawyers,
lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of
common interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's
representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common
interest, in any combination.
(c) Who may claim the privilege? The privilege may be claimed by the client,
the client's guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased
client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation,
association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The person

who was the lawyer at the time of the communication is presumed to have
authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1} Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client
knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud; or
(2) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communication relevant
to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client
regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by
inter vivos transaction; or
(3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communication relevant to an
issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the client to the
lawyer; or
(4) Document attested by lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue
concerning a document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or
(5} Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common
interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any
of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an
action between any of the clients.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Rule 504 is based upon proposed Rule 503 of the United States Supreme
Court. Rule 504 would replace and supersede Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2)
and is intended to be consistent with the ethical obligations of confidentiality
set forth in Rule 1.6 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Committee revised the proposed rule of the United States Supreme Court
to address the issues raised in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 ; 101 S.
Ct. 677 [1981], as to when communications involving representatives of a
corporation are protected by the privilege. The Committee rejected limiting
the privilege to members of the "control group" and added as subparagraph
(a)(4) a definition for "representative of the client" that includes within the
privilege disclosures not only of the client and the client's formal
spokesperson, but also employees who are specifically authorized to
communicate to the lawyer concerning a legal matter. The word "specifically"
is intended to preclude a general authorization from the client for the client's
employees to communicate under the cloak of the privilege, but is intended to

allow the client, as related to a specific matter, to authorize the client's
employees as "representatives" to disclose information to the lawyer as to
that specific matter with confidence that the disclosures will remain within
the lawyer-client privilege.
A "representative" of the lawyer need not be directly paid by the lawyer as
long as the representative meets the requirement of being engaged to assist
the lawyer in providing legal services. Thus, a person paid directly by the
client but working under the control and direction of the lawyer for the
purposes of providing legal services satisfies the requirements of
subparagraph (a)(3). Similarly, a representative of the client who may be an
independent contractor, such as an independent accountant, consultant or
person providing other services, is a representative of the client for purposes
of subparagraph (a)(5) if such person has been engaged to provide services
reasonably related to the subject matter of the legal services or whose service
is necessary to provide such service.
The client is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the confidential
communication, but also to prevent disclosure by the lawyer or others who
were involved in the conference or learned, without the knowledge of the
client, the content of the confidential communication. Problems of waiver are
dealt with by Rule 507.
Under subparagraph (b) communications among the various people involved
in the legal matter, relating to the providing of legal services, are all privileged,
except for communications between clients. Those are privileged only if they
are part of a conference with others involved in legal services.
Subparagraph (c) allows the "successor, trustee, or similar representative of a
corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in existence"
to claim the privilege. Where there is a dispute as to which of several persons
has claims to the rights of a previously existing entity, the court will be
required to determine from the facts which entity's claim is most consistent
with the purposes of this rule.
The Committee considered and rejected an exception to the rule for
communications in furtherance of a tort. Disallowing the privilege where the
lawyer's services are sought in furtherance of a crime or fraud is consistent
with the trend in other states. The Committee considered extending the
exception to include "intentional torts," but concluded that because of the
broad range of conduct that may be found to be an intentional tort, such an

exception would create undesirable ambiguities and uncertainties as to when
the privilege applies.
The Committee felt that exceptions to the privilege should be specifically
enumerated, and further endorsed the concept that in the area of exceptions,
the rule should simply state that no privilege existed, rather than expressing
the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the privilege. The Committee wanted to
avoid any possible clashes with the common law concepts of "waiver."
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Examples of leading questions and hearsay testimony from the
record:
Below, find a grand total of 216 instances of leading by Mr. Daines
throughout the trial, only several of which the Defendant objects to, but
because he is trained not to object, the entire trial results in the prosecutor
speaking for the witnesses. Furthermore, find 17 instances of allowed
hearsay throughout this bench trial, with the Defendant representing
himself, pro se, having waived his right to a jury and putting his fate in the
hands of the Judge. Below, labeled as "NOTE" find instances where the
Court trained the Defendant not to object and to feel that objecting to
leading questions and hearsay instances would be useless.

Mr. Daines Direct of Ms. Susan Wyatt Weight at (R. 309/19):
Leading Questions
(R. 308/22) line 3-4,15-16,18-20, 24
(R. 308/23) line 20 - 21
[R. 308/24) line 1
(R. 308/25) line 11-12
(R. 308/26) line 16,18
(R. 308/27) line 20, 23-24
(R. 308/28) line 23-24
(R. 308/29) line 17
(R. 308/32) line 22-24
(R. 308/33) line 6-7,15,17-19
(R. 308/34) line 9, 20, 23-24

Hearsay

[R. 308/36} line 9
[R. 308/37} line 12
(R. 308/38} line 6, 8-10,19
(R. 308/40} line 13-14,16-19
(R. 308/41} line 7-10
[R. 308/42} line 17 - hearsay
(R. 308/43} line 18-19
(R. 308/44} line 12
(R. 308/45) line 16, 20-21, 23-24
(R. 308/46} line 25 - (R. 308/47} line 1
(R. 308/50} line 5-8,11,21
(R. 308/51} line 1-2,4
[R. 308/52} line 2, 8
(R. 308/53} line 5-6, 8

Mr. Daines Direct of Ms. Miya at (R. 308/65):
(R. 308/65) line 23-24
(R. 308/66) line 1-2,4-5, 8,18-21,
23, 6 6 - ( R . 308/67) line 1
(R. 308/67) line 3-4
(R. 308/68) line 18-19, 21-22

At fR. 308/88) Mr. Daines Direct of Mr. Shervl Reed Weight:
Leading

Hearsay

(R. 308/89) line 14
(R. 308/94) line 6-7,14
(R. 308/96) line 17-19
(R. 308/97) line 1-2,4-5, 9,13-15,
17,19-20
(R. 308/98} line 1-2, 8-9, 21-22
(R. 308/99) line 10-11, 21
(R. 308/100) line 2-3, 5-6,13
(R. 308/101) line 23-24
(R. 308/102) line 12,14,17,19
(R. 308/103) line 7-8, 9-10,
19-20:
Statements
that
assertive conduct by Cramer
was to show coins - he is not
there to testify to this
statement of conduct and
therefore these statements of
what he did is hearsay.
(R. 308/104) line 6-8 (To which
Mr. Underwood Objects, is
Overruled, and leading again seen)
line 23-24.

(R. 308/105) line 13-14
(R. 308/106) line 4-5
(R.308/108) line 11-12
(R. 308/110) line 1,10-11
(R.308/111) line 24-25
(R. 308/112) line 2-3
(R. 308/123) line 21-22
(R. 308/143) line 5, 8-9,13-14,16-18

Direct of Charles Dale Hall by Mr. Daines. R. 308/145 to 154):
Leading
(R. 308/146) line 20-22
(R. 308/147) line 5-7,12-15
(R. 308/148) line 14
(R. 308/149) line 1, 3, 5, 20
(R. 308/150) line 21-22, 24-25
(R. 308/151) line 2,11-12
(R. 308/152) line 4-5, 7, 9, 21
(R. 308/153) line 9,16-18

Hearsay

Direct of Serena Weight by Mr. Daines at (R. 308/158):
Leading
(R. 308/158) line 11-12
(R. 308/ 159) line 6, 8,18
(R. 308/162) line 3-4,13,18-19, 23, 25
(R. 308/163) line 15-16
(R. 308/165) line 8,17,21-22
(R. 308/166) line 6-7,18, 22-23
[R. 308/167) line 5
(R. 308/169) line 4, 23-24
(R. 308/170) line 13-14, 20-21
(R. 308/171) line 3, 8,10
(R. 308/173) line 20
(R. 308/175) linel6-17
(R. 308/176) line 12-14

Hearsay

Direct of Antionette Wyatt Weight by Mr. Daines (R. 308/1781:
Leading

Hearsay

(R. 308/178) line 5-6, 8,10-11,15,17-18
(R. 308/179) line 2-3,17, 20-21, 25
(R. 308/180) line 12,14
(R. 308/181) line 2-3
NOTE* Re: Training examples: (R. 308/184 Defendant cites hearsay as to
the content of the purse, as there is no itemized description re: Exhibit P2.
The Court notes the objection but allows the evidence, noting the issue of
weight).
NOTE* Re: Mr. Underwood, Defendant, being trained to not object at (R.
308/186) line 2-8: This passage represents the tone of the entire trial on
record - the Defendant feeling ignored and trained not to object - that his
objections will not be heard and he is wrong to object - that it is useless
for him to object, when in fact, there were many instances where an
objection would have been proper:
THE COURT: ...Mr. Underwood, any objections to [Exhibit] 16?
MR. UNDERWOOD: Doesn't matter if I object or not.
THE COURT: It clearly matters, Mr. Underwood. I'm just trying to
rule on the law as I have it. Do you have objections to that?
MR. UNDERWOOD: Whatever (inaudible).
THE COURT: Thank you. It's received.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 received)

Also see result of Defendant's "training" regarding motions at: (R.
308/186) line 23-24: "...I seem to be ignored on this..."

Direct of Mr. lason Ray by Mr. Daines at (R. 309/1891:
Leading

Hearsay

(R. 309/189) line 18-20
(R. 309/192) line 19-20

(R. 309/192) line 14-18 (The
P.D. is not testifying here - this
evidence is hearsay.

(R. 309/194) line 10-11,15-16,23-24

(R. 309/194)
linelO-20(No
presentation of this public
knowledge - he is not the
Sheriffs Department nor the
Government and can not speak
to this - the evidence presented
is hearsay.

(R. 309/195) line 195
(R. 309/197) line 11, 22

Direct of Mr. Dirk Ouinney by Mr. Daines at (R. 309/202):
Leading

Hearsay

(R. 309/202) line 16-19, 25
(R. 309/203) line 2,19

(R. 309/203) line 10 Coin
evidence is hearsay - there is not
a valid foundation for this
evidence by Mr. Quinney because
he did not pick the coin up
himself from the Pawn Shop, and

did not even recognize the voice
of the Pawn Shop worker on the
phone, not to mention that below,
(on page 204 of the record},
Assistant Chief Warren and Chief
Affuvai, who were said to have
picked up the coin, were not
witnesses, not crossed, and
therefore this is all Hearsay,
through p 205:
(R. 309/204} line 12-13
(R.309/204} line 4-25 (*20-23}
(R. 309/205} line 1-6 (Neither
testimony nor cross of Assistant
Chief Kevin D. Warren: All Coin
evidence.
(R. 309/206} line 4-8
(R. 309/207} line 8-9,18-19, 21-22
(R. 309/208} line 25

(R. 309/208} line 11-22

(R. 309/209} line 1-3, 5-6,16-18, 20
(R. 309/210} line 1-3, 8, 20-23, 25

(line 18-19, St. George P.D.}

(R. 309/211} line 1,12-13,15-16
(R. 309/213} line 17-18 (Ford
had no record but Ford not
called to testify nor crossed re:
this information so it's hearsay
(R. 309/214} line 5 - Deputy
Cardinal,
Mojave
County
Sheriff's Office was never called
nor crossed on the stand... and
therefore, the location re:

testimony and photographs
hearsay, although allowed
the judge - objected to by
Defendant, but allowed by
Judge.

are
by
the
the

(R. 309/214) line 12-14,16, 21-23
(R. 309/215) line 1-3, 9-11
(R. 309/217) line 17-19, 24-25
(R. 309/218) line 8 (whole pg?!

(R. 309/218) line 3-5 (Tri State
not called to testify to this fact
nor crossed regarding this
evidence.
(R. 309/219) line 18-20; Deputy
Cardinal with the Mojave County
not called/crossed...

(R. 309/220) linel0-ll, 21
(R. 309/222) line 22
(R. 309/223) line 3-4, 20-21, 25
(R. 309/224) linel, 3,13-14, 21-22
(R. 309/225) line 11-12
(R. 309/227) line 10-12,14

*NOTE (R. 309/228) Mr. Bouhwuis makes clear he is not objecting for the
Defendant: line 14-16: not protecting him from hearsay by objecting...*

Direct of Mr. Mohamed Amer by Mr. Daines. at (R. 309/277):
Leading

Hearsay

(R. 309/278) line 2,4, 6,16-17

(line 20 - 23 hearsay): no one
from the sheriffs department is
testifying to this procedure so it
is hearsay - and they are being
offered for their truth - that this
was an
alleged
contract
between the Defendant and the
Pawn Shop in Salt Lake, where
Amer was manager - the Judge
allows contracts not signed to
be entered into evidence
without a proper foundation without the signed contracts
supposedly now located at the
sheriffs office but no one from
the Sherriff s office is there to
testify to that fact, nor to be
crossed regarding that fact to
guard against testamentary
infirmities.

(R. 309/279) line 16-17,19-20, 24-25
(R. 309/280) line 11-12
(R. 309/281) line 2-4
(R. 309/282) line 24
(R. 309/283) line 6,19, 21

Back to Direct of Mr. Dirk Ouinney at (R. 309/2911:
Leading

Hearsay

(R. 309/291) line 15-16
(R. 309/292) line 10,12,16-17

(R. 309/293) line 1,14-18, 23-25

(R. 309/292) line 6-13 previous
witness Dale Hall—did not say
this but prosecutor tried to lead
him into this testimony at page
146-7.

